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The GCC: Gulf State Integration or Leadership Cooperation? 
NEIL PARTRICK 
Abstract 
The GCC was forged as an alliance of politically like-minded states which sought 
to cooperate in the face of perceptibly increasing security threats. The conflict 
between Iraq and Iran presented security threats to the different Gulf Arab regimes. 
Saudi Arabia was concerned that the war could encourage some of the smaller 
states to bandwagon with one of the two adversaries. The smaller Gulf states were 
prepared to work with Saudi Arabia in preference to the greater threat of Iraq and 
Iran. The Gulf Arab hereditary regimes formed an association whose launch 
reflected Arab and national norms by not defining itself in opposition to others and 
by emphasizing economic cooperation, not common security interests. The 
ideational construct of Gulf cooperation proved insufficient to overcome the state-
centric rationale of maximizing national sovereignty through loose regional 
political cooperation and bilateral defence pacts with Washington. The increased 
economic weight of some of the GCC states has seen a competitive search for 
international prestige that has sometimes been expressed through the construct of 
‘regional’ interests but is fundamentally state-leadership focused. These leaderships 
remain pivotal in polities largely defined by a ruling family where there is little 
tradition or practical capacity for devolving authority. As such a major transfer of 
political authority to supra-state GCC institutions also remains a far-off prospect.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper will consider the rationale for the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and assess its progress according to both the original and subsequent criteria 
agreed by the member states. The paper will ask why the GCC was formed and to what 
end, and whether its degree of collective decision-making suggests that the politics of the 
GCC states should be understood as in any way having become supranational or simply 
as remaining state orientated, albeit dressed in collective colours for the sake of national 
or wider legitimacy. In addressing these issues the paper will utilize theoretical 
perspectives to try to understand the development of this multinational body and why the 
authority that has been ceded is relatively limited. Neo-realist and constructivist 
arguments will be drawn on in consideration of the role and purpose of the GCC. 
 
22. BACKGROUND TO, AND RATIONALE FOR, THE GCC’S FORMATION 
The GCC, the grouping that brings together Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), has not changed substantially from the 
organization that was launched in 1981. This ‘cooperative council’ (majlis Al-Ta’wuun)
of the ‘states of the Arabian Gulf’ continues to be a platform upon which the political 
leaderships of six neighbouring states seek to cooperate or collaborate in areas of 
common interest. The GCC was never intended to be a supra-governmental body, nor is it 
likely to become one.  
The introduction to the founding charter of the GCC commits the member 
countries to achieving ‘coordination, integration and interdependence (tashseeq, takamal 
wa tarabit) between them in all fields’. Going on to list the objectives of the GCC, the 
charter says that this ‘coordination, integration and interdependence’ should be achieved 
in order to ‘achieve unity between them’.1 However the only identified areas in which 
this should occur are economic and financial affairs; commerce, customs and 
communications; and education and culture. In these areas the charter states that there 
should be ‘similar regulations’. The concepts used are problematic. Coordination is akin 
to cooperation. By contrast, integration, takamal (literally, becoming ‘whole’ or 
‘unified’) has an implication, at a minimum, of reducing the independence of national 
decision-making. This may be partly applicable to the economic regulatory structure the 
GCC eventually agreed. However, the stated objective of achieving ‘unity’ appears to be 
more about making an ideational nod in the direction of the wider aim of Arab unity, 
which the charter is also at pains to stress that the GCC is not a deviation from, and 
towards which ‘coordination’ etc. will benefit the ‘Arab nation’.2 At the same time the 
constraining of this vision to ‘similar regulations’ in, broadly speaking, economic and 
cultural fields suggests that political unity among the Gulf Arab states would be rather 
limited in practice. At the root of this official language is the idea that sovereign states 
with broadly comparable political systems and cultural traditions, which have ‘ties of 
special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the creed of 
Islam’, should cooperate in areas of mutual advantage.  
 
1 GCC charter, Article 4, http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/index. 
2 Ibid. 
3The GCC took the spirit of cooperation in which it was formed into aspects of 
security as well as economic and cultural affairs. It has not achieved political integration 
in the process, nor has it affected to do so. Riyadh, the location of the GCC’s 
headquarters, the Secretariat, is not Brussels (Barnett and Gause 1998). However, some 
small aspects of integration have been achieved in the common regulations that affect a 
number of features of economic activity. More informal cooperation is practised on 
matters of internal security, while GCC external defence is largely a symbolic display of 
unity represented by a numerically and practically limited force. Some intellectuals 
outside of the government realm have a conception of the Gulf as a geopolitical space 
confined to the territory of the six conservative hereditary Arab regimes. They have 
conceptualized shared interests, encouraged by the forming of the GCC and by the 
resentments and outright hostilities that its mostly energy-rich members have attracted 
from other Middle Eastern states.3 However, the GCC remains a cooperative alliance of 
states whose agreements have not fundamentally compromised their sovereignty, nor 
were ever intended to. Their attachment to each other is limited by degrees of mistrust 
and a related focus on western security partners, even though the USA did not begin to 
play an active role in the security of many of the smaller Gulf states until the latter 1980s 
(Partrick 2006). In order to understand fully how the GCC has been successful as a 
cooperative platform for trying to advance national interests, but limited in its ability to 
encourage states to reconceptualize those interests substantially, we need to look at the 
circumstances in which the GCC was founded and the context in which the above and 
subsequent official aims emerged. 
Saudi analyst Turki Al-Rasheed argues that it was ‘Natural behaviour for birds of 
a feather … to gather together and engage’, and cites the role of former Kuwait emir 
Sheikh Jabr Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah in encouraging the process (interview, Al-Rasheed, 
2010). In the mid-1960s Britain promoted a Trucial States Council of British-protected 
Gulf sheikhdoms. The formerly British-protected and newly independent Kuwait 
responded by proposing to send teachers, medics and money to Qatar, Bahrain, Abu 
 
3 From 1980 onwards Gulf academics and writers would more regularly exchange ideas about the 
commonality of identity in the Gulf. The muntada Al-Tanmiya (Development Forum), for instance, held an 
annual conference solely involving intellectuals from the six GCC states. See Barnett and Gause (1998: 
178–9). 
4Dhabi and Dubai in the hope of shepherding their future political development and 
gaining security in the process, including from Saudi Arabia (Partrick 2006). This, 
though, was looked on with suspicion by some of the recipients, which, like Britain, saw 
the hand of Egypt behind Kuwait’s generosity. In 1968 the extra-regional Gulf 
policeman, Britain, which had first begun its role of Gulf protector in the early part of the 
nineteenth century with a series of ‘truces’ signed with local rulers, declared that in three 
years it was withdrawing from its defence role in the area, and therefore ending its 
commitment to the protection of the ruling families of the Gulf littoral. The Trucial States 
Council therefore morphed into the UAE minus what became the sovereign states of 
Qatar and Bahrain. The UAE endured troubled early relations with Saudi Arabia, which 
was suspicious of the newly independent UK-backed Gulf states, and which withheld 
recognition of the UAE until it secured a border agreement with Abu Dhabi to its liking 
in 1974. However, this border has never been completely accepted by Abu Dhabi, 
something that in recent years has helped sully UAE–Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia had 
had troubled relations with Britain because of the latter’s support for the Gulf littoral 
states, and had from1945 begun to look to the USA as its external protector. In that year 
an understanding was reached based on the USA’s desire to build and operate an air field 
at Dhahran near to the Kingdom’s Gulf shoreline (Palmer 1992: 25–9), an agreement that 
provided the basis for future defence cooperation between the two countries. For its part 
Bahrain provided an official home in the Gulf to the US Navy as soon as the British 
departed in 1971. 
In the wake of the Gulf security vacuum caused by Britain’s departure, there were 
some early glimmerings of Gulf Arab state cooperation under Saudi Arabia’s inevitably 
dominant wing. In 1976 Riyadh responded by initiating a commitment by the six Gulf 
state interior ministers to cooperate on cross-border security affairs. In what would prove 
to be a foretaste of their fear of antagonizing their powerful Gulf neighbours when they 
founded the GCC itself, the Gulf Arabs then invited Iraq and Iran to a summit meeting of 
regional foreign ministers in Muscat later that year. However, suggestions from Iraq and 
Iran of a formal security pact of all eight states were politely resisted, as have been 
subsequent Iranian initiatives on this score. Notably, the Saudi initiative had emerged 
from interior minister Prince Naif bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud’s concern at the poor state of 
5relations within the UAE between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, due to moves by Abu Dhabi to 
federalize the armed forces largely under its control (Holden and Johns 1982: 448). Saudi 
Arabia, while it had had been wary of the founding of the UAE, saw internal fissures in 
the Gulf states as an opportunity for other states to exploit, and thereby damage Saudi 
interests. Saudi Arabia secured a commitment among the six to extradite political 
‘criminals, malcontents and dissidents’ (Holden and Johns 1982: 448). The Gulf Arab 
states were aware that their closer political cooperation would create much suspicion in a 
shah fiercely sensitive to what he saw as radical Arab and, separately, historic British 
intrigue across the Gulf. Also, the Ba’athist leadership in Iraq could use any suspicion of 
a British-backed ‘club’ of Gulf Arab states to try to delegitimize local rulers ideologically 
or to promote instability on the ground. At the elite non-governmental as well as at the 
government-backed cultural level, it was assumed during this period that Iraq would be a 
part of any Gulf state gathering. The nadwa Al-Tanmiya (Development Panel) of 
intellectuals founded in the late 1970s had originally included an Iraqi. Feeling perhaps 
an ideational need to express solidarity with an Iraq whose conflict with Iran many of the 
GCC states were aiding, the Arab Bureau of Education of the Gulf States, formed in 
1975, included Iraq in its activities.4 It would later grant Yemen membership as part of 
that country’s loose association with the GCC. 
The outbreak of the Iraq–Iran war in 1980 provided both the impetus for the Gulf 
Arab hereditary regimes to try to form a clearer association, and the opportunity to do so 
without attracting so much opprobrium from their neighbours as to render the project 
stillborn. Just as with the Saudi initiative in 1976, the founding of the GCC in 1981 
reflected a desire to cooperate in the face of internal security fears related to external 
actors. One of the two actors – the newly established revolutionary Shia Islamist regime 
in Iran – was engaged in heated ideological antipathy to the Gulf Arabs, and, it was 
feared, would attempt to weaken Saudi Arabia and a number of other Gulf states from 
within. At the same time a revived Arab nationalist enthusiasm for Saddam Hussein’s 
leadership of Iraq, which was partly responding to Iran’s assertiveness, was evident 
 
4 For instance, in 1986 the bureau published a book showcasing al-fananeen al-tashkeeleen fi dawla al-
Khaleej al-Arabi (‘the varieties of art in the states of the Arab Gulf’). It gave ample space for Iraqi artists 
among the seven ‘Gulf Arab states’ represented. The GCC claims the Bureau as a forerunner of its 
committee of education ministers. (see GCC Secretariat-General 2009). 
6among some Gulf Arab intellectuals. From a Saudi perspective, an established sympathy 
among some of the Kuwaiti and other small Gulf states’ merchant classes for Arab 
nationalism (Partrick 2006), and Dubai’s strong historical connection to Iran (in the 
course of the Iran–Iraq war the emirate was the Islamic Republic’s sole Gulf trading 
partner), created fears that some of the Gulf leaderships might bandwagon with one or the 
other of the most powerful regional players. In the words of a Saudi government adviser, 
the GCC was founded following the British departure ‘to avoid the situation of those 
states lacking protection looking elsewhere’ (interview, Saudi government adviser, 2010). 
The Gulf states were not yet in individual defence partnerships with the USA. Wider 
instabilities in Afghanistan and East Africa, and a Soviet-backed regime on the Arabian 
Peninsula (South Yemen), compounded the threat perceptions. Therefore a drawing 
together in both practical cooperation and in an ‘instrumental use of [Gulf] identity in 
order to enhance their security’ (Barnett and Gause 1998: 172) led to the GCC’s 
founding.  
The GCC charter gave expression to a projected common identity, but said little 
about security threats. This public emphasis on economics and culture (and not security) 
was chiefly to appease Iraq and Iran. However, to a greater or lesser extent, it also 
reflected concerns about Saudi Arabia among the smaller Gulf states. Historically, most 
of them had been territorially squeezed by the Al-Saud and feared that meaningful 
political integration would only enhance prospective Saudi hegemony in the future. In 
this sense countries that earlier in the twentieth century had faced a Saudi territorial 
challenge – Oman and Abu Dhabi, in the case of Buraimi in 1952–5, and Kuwait, which 
lost two thirds of its territory to the Al-Saud in 1922 – were bandwagoning with one 
perceived threat, Saudi Arabia, in order to try to offset a greater concern, Iraq and Iran. 
Like the residual defence partnership between the newly independent Gulf states and the 
British, and their varying attempts to embrace the emergent foreign Gulf power of the 
USA, this was not a security relationship that could speak its name. It also emphasizes 
that the GCC is not an alliance that benefits from a core state or states whose role of 
driver is widely accepted. Because of its size and economic strength, that role would 
naturally fall to Saudi Arabia, as it did to the USA in NATO and to France and Germany 
7in the EU, but there continues to be firm resistance among the smaller Gulf states to 
Saudi Arabia’s playing any such role in the GCC.  
3. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
As soon as the GCC was founded, an agreement to realize its economic aspirations was 
signed. The Unified Economic Agreement of 1981 promised a common currency, a 
collective negotiating structure intended to strengthen the hand of all six states in trade 
negotiations, and agreement on oil and industrial policy, among other aims. However, for 
the most part economic integration was in practice put on the back burner, at least as far 
as intergovernmental agreements were concerned, until the 2000s. Practical steps towards 
aspects of economic integration have in recent years begun to give meaning to some of 
the ambitions of the 1981 economic treaty. The Director-General of International 
Relations at the GCC Secretariat, Abdulaziz Al-Uwaisheg, notes that it is better to ‘start 
with some facts on the ground’ before you launch something (interview, Al-Uwaisheg, 
2010). In 2003 the GCC Customs Union was launched after collective agreement had 
been forged on a common 5 per cent tariff to external trade. Its introduction was made 
necessary by the GCC’s desire to secure a free trade agreement with the EU, and it 
followed a longstanding free trade agreement among member states. The finalization of 
agreement on a mechanism for transferring revenues collected on non-GCC goods at their 
point of entry to the GCC is still incomplete – differences over revenue collection and 
transfer have proved a point of dispute among member states. However, the customs 
union has harmonized arrangements over what had become a growing if, at no more than 
10 per cent, a decidedly minor component of total GCC trade. Some member states are 
coordinating their revenue collections processes, even if the GCC lacks a single 
mechanism for transferring revenues and sharing the necessary data and information. Just 
as with the GCC common market, a proposal long in embryo which was initialled with a 
five-year target for agreeing its key tracks and then launched in December 2007, aspects 
of sovereignty have been conceded on the basis of some overall economic gain. A 
technical committee, the finance and economic cooperation committee (consisting of the 
relevant ministers from the member states), follows up on the nuts and bolts of what is 
required to implement the common market and, as do other such ministerial committees, 
8makes recommendations to the GCC’s highest authority, the Supreme Council (of heads 
of member states).  
A degree of political will existed to realize longstanding economic partnership 
ambitions, a logic encouraged by the growing economic strength of Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE and Qatar in particular, and a concomitant desire to try to address burgeoning 
population needs by some moves towards economic harmonization in order to encourage 
inward investment and diversification. More prosaically, economic progress also enabled 
the GCC to produce momentum for a project that was otherwise floundering. From the 
outset the Gulf states had been more comfortable committing themselves to economic 
cooperation than to a security partnership, let alone being willing to compromise their 
national sovereignty by integrating their security or defence functions. 
According to the GCC Secretariat, out of hundreds of areas of trade and business 
that form part of the common market, only four remain without agreement: recruitment, 
haj services, sole agencies, and printing and publishing (interview, Al-Uwaisheg, 2010). 
Enabling legislation in each member state remains outstanding in a number of areas, 
however, even if the intragovernmental process has seen agreement on such key areas as 
labour mobility and pensions. A special committee organized by the UAE finance 
ministry, set up to discuss the common market and to feed into the GCC’s finance and 
economic cooperation committee, has noted that the official ambitions for the market 
suffer from restrictions on real estate ownership, a preference for local products or GCC 
products regardless of quality and price, an absence of unified and binding GCC laws, 
different accounting systems for companies, legislation gaps, and lack of uniformity in 
implementation of laws (Kumara 2011).  
The expanding number of GCC technical committees, drawing together ministers 
or other relevant officials from member states, is a reflection of a common desire to 
regularize and expand the GCC market and to address related needs. Some committees, 
such as health, agriculture and education, have been in existence as long as or longer than 
the GCC itself. They usually discuss ways to extend cooperation, whether in research or 
in more practical ways. However, government policy in these sectors is largely driven by 
national governments. In the education field, for instance, national policy has become if 
anything more distinct, with different approaches to preparing students for the jobs 
9market, for instance, and to the role of religious instruction. Higher education has also 
become quite competitive, even within countries (Partrick 2010a). The attempt to move 
towards a more service-sector, ‘post-oil’ economy in some states has seen rival education 
cities or zones with prestige and sometimes under-regulated foreign universities setting 
up shop, while national (or emirate-specific in the UAE case) universities seek to outdo 
each other in partnerships with foreign academia and businesses (Partrick 2010a). There 
is some collective research conducted at the Arabian Gulf University, based in Bahrain, 
for instance, whose founding also predates the GCC. However, this is not given the 
attention in member states that a number of their national universities are, such as the 
King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) in Saudi Arabia, and the 
Emirates University in Abu Dhabi. 
A GCC Standardization Committee was founded in 2011 to tackle the disparity 
between product regulation in differing GCC countries. Hitherto some of these issues 
were left to the commerce committee to discuss. The thorny issue of ensuring GCC-wide 
enforcement of a single patent in a market in which counterfeit goods proliferate is 
addressed by the GCC Patents Office and its grievances office. Their decisions are 
supposed to be backed by national legal enforcement.  
Many of the GCC’s committees and bodies have a discursive or administrative 
remit only, and at most can make recommendations to the Supreme Council, which in 
turn often passes issues to its consultative commission in Muscat for further discussion. 
The Consultative Commission brings together a set of experts from each of the GCC 
states to consider policy or regulatory issues on a range of matters. A newly created 
presidency of the consultative commission sits in on Supreme Council meetings as well.  
In May 2009 the GCC states agreed to found a monetary policy committee as a 
stepping stone to monetary union, albeit that Oman and the UAE subsequently decided to 
opt out, and the target date continues to be adjusted in the light of political and practical 
problems. There are a number of steps not yet in place among a conceivable first tier of 
common currency members, including common financial regulations, good relations with 
each other’s financial markets, and accessible shared statistical data through a common 
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database. In theory the ‘variable geometry’5 of the EU, whose members are at different 
stages of integration, could be applied to the GCC. However, the Eurozone crisis in 2011, 
and the problems caused by weak adherence to convergence criteria and poor fiscal 
management in countries able to operate without the enforcement of common financial 
management mechanisms, have further weakened the desire to move ahead in the GCC. 
If the apparent ‘remedy’ in the EU of closer financial integration between states 
(Alderman and Kanter 2011) is politically difficult for European countries to agree, it is 
certainly a very long way off in the Gulf.  
There has been on-off progress since 1991 on negotiations towards a free trade 
area between the GCC and the EU. Throughout the intra-GCC discussions, and the GCC–
EU negotiations, the GCC Secretariat in Riyadh has provided research back-up and 
policy recommendations to the member states to assist their deliberations. Both the 
Secretariat’s functional role and the outcome of intra-GCC economic initiatives suggest 
that the GCC is developing some supra-governmental features in aspects of economic 
affairs. In addition the GCC, while begun by a top-down process when a coherent 
Khaleeji fealty had been lacking, has taken on a life outside of inter-regime cooperation. 
For instance, the Gulf Chambers of Commerce and Industry meet on a regular basis and 
have provided impetus for efforts to secure economic agreements within the GCC and 
input into the GCC’s negotiations with the EU.  
The GCC Secretariat argues that, having agreed the customs union, GCC member 
states cannot alter the agreed tariff without collective GCC approval (interview, Al-
Uwaisheg, 2010). However, Oman and Bahrain created a problem for the GCC’s 
collective management of trade by signing bilateral free trade agreements with the USA 
in 2006 without coordinating with the GCC. Bahrain and Oman attracted strong criticism 
from Saudi Arabia for their unilateralism, albeit that the 5 per cent tariff would apply 
should any US goods then be transferred from either of these countries to any other part 
of the GCC.  
Member state governments have embraced a modest pooling of sovereignty for 
the common (economic) good. However, set against the impression of a ‘communitaire’ 
 
5 A phrase used by UK prime minister John Major shortly after he came to power in 1991 to describe the 
different levels of integration that he believed could operate in the EU.  
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feeling is a statism at the heart of the economic decision-making structure. Saudi Arabia, 
for instance, has used its weight to dominate the GCC stance on negotiations with the 
EU. Commenting on Saudi deputy finance minister Hamid Bazie’s leadership of the GCC 
side in its problematic negotiations with the EU, Saudi academic Ibrahim Al-Duraiby 
argues, ‘The contacts that did exist went through the GCC, where Saudi Arabia, due to its 
clout (in economy, politics, military etc.) could effectively direct the GCC’s negotiations 
and decisions from within’ (Al-Duraiby 2009: 170). If a GCC–EU free trade area sees the 
light of day it will, however, be as a structured exception to the tariff agreed for the 
customs union, unlike the unilateral moves of Oman and Bahrain. 
Notably, any GCC–EU agreement will have to be approved by each member 
state. Mr Al-Bazie is able to wear a GCC ‘hat’ and to draw on the institutional support of 
the Secretariat in negotiations where in theory he sits opposite his EU counterparts in a 
comparable role. In practice he is a senior Saudi official authorized to represent the GCC 
in a process whose final agreement will need to be individually approved by each GCC 
member state government. EU Commission representatives in the trade negotiations 
periodically need to consult with more powerful member states.6 However, EU member 
states do not wield a veto over an agreement that, as far as the EU is concerned, is in the 
hands of the Commission negotiators, nor are they able to affect the role of the EU 
Parliament significantly in providing final treaty ratification. Saudi Arabia sees the 
collective GCC framework as a way of maximizing its national weight in negotiations 
with the economically powerful EU. While collective empowerment is partly the logic 
for states that join the EU, Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent the less powerful GCC 
states utilize the collective weight of this external relationship, but without being 
prepared to concede significant national authority in the process. Competing national 
interests periodically constrain the operation of the EU as a cohesive unit, not least on 
foreign and security policy, and so much so that the USA has complained that it does not 
know whom to talk to concerning EU matters. However, there are clear and defined areas 
of collective responsibility in the EU for which there is an ‘address’ or a ‘phone number’. 
 
6 For instance, French president Nicolas Sarkozy played an active role in his capacity of representing 
France in 2008 when it held the six-month revolving presidency of the EU Council. 
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Even within the area of GCC economic affairs, the Secretariat is plainly not the location 
where the GCC’s external economic relations are managed. 
It should be noted, though, that there have been some infrastructural 
developments that could literally tie the GCC member states more closely together. For 
example, the development of national rail capability will, it is hoped, facilitate interstate 
travel throughout the GCC and possibly to Europe via Syria and Turkey. Railway 
construction is taking place in the UAE, whose emirates are not integrated other than by 
road, and in Saudi Arabia. It is supposed to begin in Qatar in 2012, where it is planned to 
include a link to Saudi Arabia eventually. However, a Qatari rail link to Bahrain may still 
be subject to a Saudi objection to the planned causeway on which it would run, given 
what Riyadh has in the past claimed would be a Qatari intrusion across Saudi maritime 
boundaries. Residual Saudi–Qatari tensions may affect their willingness to be connected 
physically by rail, even if Qatar will need Saudi Arabia’s help as an entry point for 
construction and other materials in advance of Doha hosting the 2022 football World 
Cup. With the need for rail development arguably greater in the ‘disunited Arab 
Emirates’7 and in populous and sprawling Saudi Arabia, national rail development has, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, been slower in Kuwait and Oman. Taking a leaf out of the GCC’s 
electricity grid development plan, prospects for an interstate rail service could 
conceivably be aided by the creation of a GCC rail authority. A common GCC electricity 
grid has been developed by the GCC Interconnection Authority (GCCIA), based in 
Khobar, which is shared by all six member states. Since 2009 it has linked four GCC 
states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar – in a common grid. In April 2011 the 
UAE hooked up to the grid too. If Oman comes on board in the planned third phase then 
GCCIA members could conceivably all be connected in 2013. This is a potentially 
valuable economic and strategic development, given the constraints on meeting domestic 
energy needs for much of the GCC, and the particular problems in the poorer northern 
emirates of the UAE and in energy-poor Bahrain (Partrick 2008). It is believed that the 
common grid will aid the development of national rail capability as well. 
 
7 A phrase coined by Valerie Grove, a former UAE resident and Arab cultural writer: 
http://naturestrikesback.blogspot.com/2009/03/dae-pavilion-at-venice-biennale.html. 
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4. SECURITY COOPERATION LIMITED 
In contrast to the relative progress in economic affairs, the undeclared component of the 
rationale behind the GCC’s formation, security cooperation, did not see serious efforts to 
formalize cooperation. Cooperation was made increasingly necessary as the 1980s saw an 
Iranian-backed coup attempt in Bahrain and Iranian-linked Shia upheaval in Kuwait, 
including an assassination attempt on the emir. However, collective efforts came unstuck 
when domestic considerations intervened. In 1986 a security agreement that would allow 
member states to call on others to constrain the political activities of exiled opposition 
figures resident in their territory was agreed by all states except Kuwait, which was 
sensitive about domestic opinion even though that year it closed down its own 
parliament. A similar effort met resistance from Kuwait and Oman in 1994.  
The creation in 1985 of the Peninsula Shield military force, consisting of units 
from all six states, implies that ‘spillover’ was occurring within a GCC ‘regime’ that was 
taking on an organizational life of its own, and where the practice of discussion in a 
collective forum creates its own political momentum (Barnett and Gause 1998). In 1987 
GCC foreign ministers declared that an attack on one member state would be regarded as 
aggression against them all, and the Supreme Council announced a joint pact to ensure 
cooperation on security matters. Problematically, however, the GCC’s military force fits 
with the artifice of its original security conception, whereby security is conceived through 
symbols not substance. In 1990 neither Saudi forces, nor the GCC joint brigade stationed 
in the Saudi town of Hafr al-Batin near Kuwait, provided any deterrence to Iraq. 
However, the GCC states put aside previous criticism of Kuwait and rallied to the 
collective cause. The deployment of GCC states’ forces in the field of battle in the 
subsequent Gulf War in sometimes mixed national units was of value as a Gulf construct. 
Nevertheless, beyond the battle of ‘symbols and shadows’ (Barnett 1998: 182), the 
GCC’s combined military force would take on little substantive purpose.  
Some Gulf commentators see the role of Saudi Arabia and the GCC differently 
and attach importance to the political symbols of security. Abdullah Bishara was the 
GCC’s first Secretary-General and might be expected to see the organization as having a 
substantal role. However, specifically in terms of being a Kuwaiti he argues that the GCC 
had great importance to his country after the Iraqi invasion. ‘The GCC is seen here as a 
14 
 
backbone. Maybe Qatar, Oman, UAE, even Bahrain don’t understand our feelings. 
Although the US and UK helped us – the liberation was fought from GCC land, with 
GCC money, and with the endorsement of the GCC’ (interview, Bishara, 2010). Of 
course Saudi Arabia was pivotal to what can be presented as a collective effort. Haila Al-
Mekaimi, a political science professor at Kuwait University, argues that for most GCC 
states ‘the main objective is to coordinate with Saudi Arabia’ because of its size and 
wealth. It ‘could protect Kuwait as it was a regional power … it was supportive, provided 
territorial depth, was the site of the military campaign to liberate Kuwait, and funded the 
campaign’ (interview, Al-Mekaimi, 2010). It might be questioned how decisive the Saudi 
role was, however, in ending the occupation and in providing security leadership 
subsequently.  
Notably, an Omani proposal made in December 1990 to give Peninsula Shield 
military teeth never got beyond the consultation stage. The 1991 Gulf War made public 
the GCC states’ undeclared unilateral military alliances with the USA, and in the process 
helped weaken collective politics and the symbolic security that went with it. It also 
emphasized to the small Gulf states, which were often wary of Saudi Arabia, that an 
external security guarantor was preferable to empowering a Gulf force dominated by 
Saudi nationals with the right to enter a small state’s national territory. The ideational 
appeal of Egypt and Syria’s contribution to the joint (Arab) command in the Gulf War 
did not survive long into the post-war era. A formal declaration of, in effect, ‘GCC+2’ 
regional cooperation was effectively buried when the GCC states balked at the potential 
security and financial implications of forces from these two states being semi-
permanently present on their soil. At the same time Peninsula Shield remained largely 
irrelevant to GCC states’ security. A commitment to enlarge its number from a modest 
5,000 and to expand its military role was made in 1993. In December 2000 a renewed 
commitment to enlargement was made, while a dedicated rapid deployment force was 
proposed and a more robust joint defence agreement was signed. In this spirit a year later 
it was decided that a Supreme Defence Council would meet annually to consider how to 
implement the agreement. By 2006 Saudi Arabia was proposing that Peninsula Shield be 
disbanded as a collective force, replaced with separate national units confined to their 
own countries but operating under a collective command. What emerged, however, was 
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an agreement in December 2009 to form a GCC Rapid Deployment Force of 10,000. It 
has been likened to a ‘fire engine’ as opposed to the more significant military actor that 
had originally been envisaged by Sultan Qaboos (interview, Bishara, 2010). The original 
Omani proposal is viewed with scorn by many who see even a 100,000 force as a 
‘symbolic’ gesture of self-reliance rather than having substantive capabilities. ‘Where are 
they? Who is going to pay for it?’ asks a leading Qatari journalist, who argues that the 
national forces are not capable of defending their own countries, and doubts how 
effective a pan-GCC force would therefore be in defending six states (interview, Qatari 
journalist, 2010).  
An example of how ideational cover has been sought by Gulf governments for the 
pursuit of naked self-interest was the presentation of Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s 
intervention in Bahrain from February 2011 as a GCC Peninsula Shield operation. Saudi 
Arabia dispatched an estimated 1,500 of its National Guard (as it had sent National Guard 
forces in response to internal Bahrain unrest in 1996), while Abu Dhabi separately 
dispatched some of its police units. (Kuwait was also believed to have sent a naval craft 
in order to show solidarity with its fellow Sunni regimes without overtly antagonizing its 
numerically significant Shia minority.) The strategic fear that the Bahraini Shia protests 
caused in Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states has raised the possibility of a more 
serious effort to boost Peninsula Shield force numbers (Kermali 2011) – probably largely 
consisting of Saudi forces. This would change the latter’s military role in its tiny de facto 
dependency into a more semi-permanent garrison dressed up in GCC colours. 
The GCC provides a useful platform for individual states to present otherwise 
unpalatable policies to their nationals. As such it has been argued that this evidences how 
the GCC’s creation affected the identity and affinities of Gulf state nationals and 
provided the potential at least for the development of an identifiable ‘security 
community’ at both the intergovernmental and non-governmental level (Barnett and 
Gause 1998). Strong support by Oman and the UAE for Kuwait after its invasion by Iraq 
was probably more acceptable to their nationals because their governments could present 
the issue in terms of a collective interest in Gulf defence. However, the collective framing 
of policy for reasons of state has not substantially altered intergovernmental behaviour, 
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much less encouraged the collective determination of Gulf affairs outside of the 
regulation of trade and the ostensible ambition to form a common currency.  
There has been some modest institutional ‘spillover’ in matters of security, but 
this has easily been set back. For instance, after efforts to agree internal security 
cooperation, the GCC’s border negotiations committee was the framework on which 
Saudi Arabia and Oman negotiated their 1992 border deal, and Qatar was prepared to 
submit its territorial dispute with Bahrain to the committee. However, Bahrain rejected 
this and ultimately the matter was resolved in 2001 at the International Court of Justice. 
In 1992 Saudi–Qatari border tensions led to a small number of fatalities and the dispute 
had to be mediated by an outside Arab leader, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. Saudi–
Qatari tensions came to the fore again in the mid-1990s over the willingness of each state 
to interfere in each other’s political affairs. The relatively informal and ad hoc nature of 
GCC states’ security cooperation, often practised on a bilateral basis, was insufficient for 
the change of regime in Qatar in 1995 to be accepted in Saudi Arabia. Riyadh objected to 
the foreign relations policies of the new emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, and 
promoted the return of his ousted father, Khalifa, in turn prompting Hamad to use the full 
force of Al Jazeera as an anti-Saudi propaganda outlet and to threaten to bring in Iranian 
or French troops in Qatar’s defence. The two countries did improve their relations and 
even managed to agree a border deal eventually, notably on a bilateral basis after first 
turning to the GCC border committee. However, relations continue to be highly sensitive. 
A leading Qatari journalist commented, ‘we can’t have common responses’ on regional 
challenges such as Iran. ‘[It’s] not a natural alliance – there is no leading country. Saudi 
Arabia is still not a strong enough country that it can lead in many issues. In 1990 Saudi 
Arabia didn’t provide security to itself or for us … It can’t persuade others of its strength, 
so everybody is their own leader’ (interview, Qatari journalist, 2010). 
5. FOREIGN POLICY MAKING 
There are institutional and practical handicaps that constrain foreign policy making 
within each of the GCC states and that therefore, in the context of jealously guarded 
political sovereignty, make it all the harder to develop a common political machinery for 
addressing joint problems. Political systems whose largely unaccountable, hierarchical 
nature prevents a considered, horizontal assessment of national policy options, involving 
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meaningful autonomy for policy specialists, understandably lack the basis to conduct this 
process at the interstate level. It is at the GCC-wide meetings of relevant ministers that 
substantive consideration of GCC foreign policy, including defence and security policy, 
is conducted. As Al-Duraiby (2009) writes, lower-level integration, even in links among 
state apparatus, does not exist. Out of this top-heavy procedure come statements drawn 
up by GCC Secretariat officials designed to paper over cracks, not to affect the subject 
being addressed. While the Secretariat can generate ideas designed to address the desire 
among GCC leaders for closer economic cooperation among themselves, it is much less 
likely to come up with innovative solutions for managing the GCC’s external relations. 
Without a basis for common political working on foreign policy, then, common foreign 
relations cannot be advanced.  
In this context the role of the Secretary-General, the head of the GCC Secretariat, 
and therefore its administrative chief, is to function as a kind of representative of agreed 
policy lines, not in any sense as an innovator or leader. It might be argued that this is akin 
to the role of the relatively newly created post of President of the European Council (EC) 
of the EU, in contrast to the President of the European Commission, the EU’s 
supranational bureaucracy. Unlike the Commission, neither the EC presidency nor the EC 
itself exercises authority in its own right. However, the post of EC President was created 
in 2009 out of recognition that the need for policy responses between meetings of the EC 
necessitated that one figure be the point of policy reference, in close consultation, of 
course, with the EU member states. The dynamic in the case of the GCC Secretary-
General is different.  
Since the GCC’s creation in 1981, the public role of the Secretary-General has 
been to embody the role of GCC ministers’ statements more than the collective will of 
the member states, which may not always be apparent. In other words, he articulates what 
has already been agreed and declines to enter into areas for which there is no clearly 
documented common position. Emblematic of the limits of the job of Secretary-General 
as anything akin to a supranational role is the fact that Abdulrahman Al-Attiyah also held 
the formal position of Qatari deputy premier, just as Mr al-Bazie, the GCC lead external 
trade negotiator with the EU, is organizationally anchored to the Saudi finance ministry. 
That said, Mr al-Attiyah was seen as an advocate behind the scenes for the GCC to 
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respond to calls for a more collective role in Yemen by responding to western 
government pressure to open a development office in Sana (interview, Abdulla, 2010). 
However, internal GCC lobbying, in tandem with the more public lobbying of western 
governments, does not suggest that Mr al-Attiyah’s ‘success’ in seeing that policy agreed 
in September 2010 at the ‘Friends of Yemen’ meeting in New York gave his office supra-
governmental features. Before the retirement of Mr al-Attiyah in December 2010, the 
issue of who should be his replacement as Secretary-General got caught up in internal 
GCC politics, rather than the potential being explored for a new incumbent to try to turn 
the job into something more akin to an executive position. The principal of alphabetically 
determined succession meant that it was Bahrain’s turn to produce a nominee, itself 
underlining how the GCC functions as a cooperative association of individual states. A 
revival in Qatari–Bahraini tensions, in part due to Doha’s engagement with Iran, 
perceived anti-Bahraini broadcasting by Al Jazeera and residual territorial sensitivities, 
made the process in effect subject to a Qatari veto. In the end agreement was reached on 
the appointment of Bahrain’s internal security chief, Abdul Latif bin Rashid Al-Zayani,
after Saudi mediation. Al-Zayani’s security role did not, seemingly, raise Qatari concerns 
that he might be an advocate for a stronger GCC role in such matters. The key issue was 
simply that he did not offend Doha after a previous Bahraini nominee, Mohammed al-
Mutawa, was associated by Qatar with hostile propaganda when he was Bahrain’s 
information minister.  
In the wake of renewed concerns among some GCC states about the prospective 
military strength and political influence of Iran following the USA-led overthrow of the 
Iraqi regime in 2003, the question of how significant a factor the GCC is in the foreign 
and defence policy calculations of its member countries has particular interest, given that 
the Iranian threat played such a key role in founding the GCC in the first place. What 
Prince Saud Al-Faisal called ‘handing Iraq to Iran on a plate’ raised severe doubts about 
the wisdom of US policy in the region, contrasted with the regimes’ enthusiasm for their 
bilateral relationship with the USA after 1990. However, this, coupled with the growing 
focus on asymmetric threats in the wake of 9/11, has contributed to what in diplomatic 
politesse would be called a more robust relationship, and more demands both on the USA 
and by it on its individual GCC allies, whether in political, security or military terms. The 
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GCC states’ apparent desire to create a more capable pan-Gulf security force is likely to 
continue to take second place to individual GCC states’ consolidation of their bilateral 
security relations with the USA as their chief foreign policy focus, for all the residual 
ideational reference to ‘the west’ as part of the outer circle of political priorities.8 This 
does not mean that there are not valuable discussions between relevant Gulf Arab 
ministers. Rising concern about Iran’s relationship to internal security threats saw an 
impromptu interior ministers’ meeting in May 2010 prior to a meeting of heads of state 
and of foreign ministers (EIU 2010b). However, the degree of practical cooperation is 
affected, as mentioned, by domestic constraints and by differing threat conceptions. 
According to Sami Al-Faraj, a consultant to the Kuwaiti leadership and to the GCC, ‘The 
GCC is now developing different [policy] modes … Saudi Arabia is aloof regarding 
Oman’, which, he argues, like Qatar, favours engagement towards Iran, while Riyadh 
‘shares the Iran threat perception of the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain’ (interview, Al-Faraj, 
2010). The importance of ad hoc subregional alliances is widely acknowledged in the 
GCC. An issue like Iran’s nuclear programme is discussed ‘both at GCC meetings and 
bilaterally’, according to a leading Qatari journalist, who says that within the GCC, ‘they 
will talk and debate issues, but everybody is taking their own position. Bilateral relations 
are sometimes more important’ (interview, Qatari journalist, 2010). 
Broad-brush GCC statements are therefore issued urging Iran to cooperate with 
the international community over its nuclear programme and in support of sanctions 
already authorized by the UN Security Council. However, coherent policy programmes 
cannot be constructed in the context of different outlooks and different calculations. 
Saudi–Qatari differences on how to approach Iran suggest a different strategy and an 
ongoing historical resentment between the GCC’s dominant actor and a newer player on 
the block. According to a Saudi government adviser, ‘Qatar is trying to accommodate 
Iran to get security’, involving it in dealing with Iranian-linked groups Hamas, Hizbollah 
‘and worse’. This is also seen by the adviser and by many others close to the Saudi 
government as ‘decisions made by a country for political glory’ (interview, Saudi 
government adviser, 2010). A well-connected Saudi journalist said, ‘Being independent 
 
8 This view was expressed to the author by the former chairman of the foreign affairs committee of the 
majlis al-shoura (consultative council) of Saudi Arabia, Dr Mohammed Ibraheem al Hulwah, in Riyadh, 
June 2007. It is referenced in Partrick (2007). 
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of Saudi Arabia seems to be an end in itself.’ A leading Qatari journalist commented that 
‘Saudi Arabia sees itself as vulnerable … as needing to have a tougher stand [on Iran], 
but other states can afford to not do so. It’s not in our hands. We are small countries and 
we are not in the business of leading or dominating everybody – this is part and parcel of 
stability in our area. We have conversations with everybody.’ He added that this is done 
in the context of the Qatari–US relationship. ‘We use it to our advantage. Otherwise,’ he 
said, ‘the experience of [Kuwait in] 1990 occurs’ (interview, Qatari journalist, 2010). 
It is not just Qatar that feels its views are not taken seriously by Saudi Arabia, and 
that the region’s traditional deference to age counts against it in the eyes of the Kingdom 
(interview, Qatari journalist, 2010). In the assessment of leading Emirati academic 
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, relations have ‘never been problem free, [but] one thing that is 
new is that the UAE and Qatar have the feeling that they’re not being treated equally, 
[but] as a junior player … [and that Saudi Arabia is] not respecting what they’ve 
achieved’ (interview, Abdulla, 2010). The exponential economic growth of gas-rich 
Qatar, the global importance of the sovereign wealth held by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the 
UAE and Kuwait, and the importance of all four countries’ energy resources and know-
how to the growth plans of China and India in particular (Ulrichsen 2010) have created a 
desire, especially on the part of Qatar and the UAE, to be taken as seriously by Saudi 
Arabia within a Gulf context as they are increasingly being taken internationally. Abdulla 
argues that ‘Unless they are treated equally’ the UAE leadership ‘intends to send a 
message: we are the second biggest economy [in the GCC], we have vast [numbers of] 
friends left and right; [and that the] “little brothers” are aware of their own strength.’ 
Abdulla cites the GCC’s decision in May 2009 to make Riyadh the headquarters of the 
precursor to the planned common currency, the GCC monetary policy committee. Noting 
that Abu Dhabi does not host any of the GCC institutions, he says that among the 
member states there was ‘an understanding that this [Abu Dhabi was] going to be the 
[monetary] HQ’. Since the death of the UAE’s founding president, Sheikh Zayyed Al-
Nahayan, in 2005, a younger generation of leaders in Abu Dhabi have been more willing 
to challenge what they consider the controversial circumstances in which the 1974 border 
agreement was made. The extent of this determination shocks some Saudis, who have 
noted that the Kingdom’s foreign minister, Saud Al-Faisal, has had the issue put to him 
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privately by a senior Abu Dhabi leader in highly undiplomatic language.9 The 
‘symbolism’ of the UAE’s depiction of a different border with Saudi Arabia in official 
documents, including on its version of the GCC’s own identity card, became wrapped up 
with the currency headquarters dispute, Emiratis concede (interview, Abdulla, 2010). In 
March 2010 a Saudi maritime border guards vessel was shot at by Abu Dhabi 
coastguards, who detained two Saudi guards for forty-eight hours (EIU 2010c). The next 
month Emirati vehicles were once again held up from crossing into Saudi Arabia for a 
few days, the second time such a delay had occurred in twelve months. In addition, the 
unpublished maritime border delimitation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in March 
2001, while evidence of an improved relationship compared to the 1990s, effectively 
compromises Emirati maritime boundary claims vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. 
Former GCC Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara argues that the GCC is in need 
of leadership. He likens the GCC to ‘a train of six carriages’ without a state to pull it. 
Saudi Arabia is inhibited, as Bishara suggests, from ‘playing the big brother role’ 
(interview, Bishara, 2010). However, this does not stop it periodically adopting a 
proprietorial attitude towards GCC affairs, which compounds the resistance of some 
states, at least, to any notion that Riyadh should ever be the engine that pulls the train, 
even if it is willing and able to play that role.  
Abdulkhaleq Abdulla argues that, despite the ‘jolt’ in progress towards monetary 
unity, the GCC has, by launching the initiative in 2010, made ‘half a step forward’. Some 
believe that the UAE will reconsider its objection, especially if it is given a symbolic 
concession by Saudi Arabia to assuage its hurt feelings. The UAE’s present opt-out, 
could, Abdulla suggests, just be a ‘bargaining position’. However, the UAE’s rejection 
continued to be firm at the December 2010 GCC Supreme Council (heads of state) 
meeting. The border issue could be even harder to resolve. Emiratis see the ‘generational’ 
issue as just as relevant to the Saudi approach to Abu Dhabi’s complaints, citing the 
important role of prospective Saudi king and current interior minister Prince Naif bin 
Abdulaziz in the original border deal (interview, Abdulla, 2010; Al-Qassemi, 2009). 
 
9 Saud Al-Faisal was, says a Saudi GCC Secretariat official who specializes in political and security 
matters, told directly that ‘our father was fooled’ over the border deal that led to Saudi recognition of the 
UAE (interview, Saudi politics and security analyst, 2010). 
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In addition to wariness among some of the smaller Gulf states regarding Saudi 
Arabia’s role in the GCC, the Al-Saud’s historic territorial expansionism (see e.g. 
Kostiner 1993) undermines its value as a security partner even when its security role in 
more recent decades has been valued. Some of the smaller GCC states share Saudi 
Arabia’s assessment of the principal regional threats and have a similar view of how to 
handle them. However, the supposedly reluctant ‘big brother’ is not looked to as their 
primary defender. Kuwait, like Bahrain, enjoys relatively close political relations with 
Saudi Arabia. Kuwait’s tendency to cleave close to Saudi Arabia grew as Egypt’s 
strength waned in the post-1967 regional environment (Partrick 2006) and was especially 
marked after the 1990 invasion by Iraq. However, even after 1990, there was 
unwillingness on the part of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states to trust Kuwait’s 
judgement concerning the extent of the Iraqi threat. According to Sami Al-Faraj, despite 
their appreciation of its role in 1990,the apparent reluctance of Saudi Arabia to support a 
coalition military build-up in 1994 led Kuwait to think that ‘We can’t wait for Saudi 
domestic decision-making … [i]t’s down to one guy: [Defence Minister Prince] Sultan 
…We can’t entrust the security of the nation to the whim of one guy’ |(interview, Al-
Faraj, 2010).  
The GCC states only conduct substantive discussions about regional security with 
the USA and they do this on a bilateral basis. A Saudi government adviser says that there 
should be ‘coordination on defence and security issues’ between the GCC states, in 
addition to trade and (planned) transport cooperation, but he rules out a common defence 
force (interview, Saudi government adviser, 2010). There may, though, be scope for more 
intra-GCC military cooperation. Having agreed in September 2010 to purchase state-of-
the-art ballistic missile defences from the USA, the UAE subsequently suggested that 
ballistic missile defence should be GCC-wide.10 This is a longstanding idea for a 
collective anti-missile shield that would in theory be collectively tied in to the US 
military. However, this idea has previously been frustrated by political as well as 
financial constraints. On the question of regional security in the event that Iran develops a 
 
10 Referencing the need for a region-wide defence system to deal with incoming ballistic missiles, Major 
General Ali Al-Kaabi, the UAE's deputy chief of staff, told a regional defence conference in early 
December 2010, ‘We must be prepared to defend our people, our nation and our region against any 
emerging threat’ (Arab News 2010a). 
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nuclear weapons capability, GCC states look chiefly to the USA. For Saudi Arabia it has 
been semi-officially conceded that this could mean enhancing the existing US security 
commitment to create an overt ‘US nuclear umbrella’.11 
It has been observed that, aside from residual sensitivities between otherwise 
cooperating states, ‘resources and capabilities’ (Fawcett 2004) limit the ability of regional 
organizations to rely on themselves for defence and security. Limited troop numbers and 
a non-martial tradition are a common feature in the GCC, with the partial exception of 
Omani military competence gained through internal security challenges. The Gulf Arab 
states look outside of the Gulf for their individual security and in doing so they chiefly 
remains focused on the USA. By contrast a Chinese role in Gulf security still looks 
remote. The unprecedented Chinese naval visit to Abu Dhabi in March 2010 largely 
related to China’s role in the international effort to combat piracy in the Red Sea and 
Arabian Sea (EIU 2010c), and hardly compares with the extensive naval and airbase 
agreements that the USA and to a lesser extent the UK have with the small Gulf states. 
China is the one Asian country with a realistic potential to play a role in Gulf security 
over the longer term, but at present lacks sufficient military reach to project power and 
seems content to ride on the back of the USA in seeking the security of Gulf oil supplies 
(Davidson 2010). However, GCC states’ suspicions of both India and China are also a 
factor in Gulf preferences for Washington. A well-connected Saudi journalist said, ‘geo-
politically they [India] are seen as a threat. They [local rulers] don’t like bringing Indian 
mercenaries.’, alluding to India’s historic role in the Gulf and the danger that ‘they may 
still be working for the [Indian] government’, a concern he said was felt about Indian 
(and other south Asian) workers. China too attracts suspicion. This is not confined to 
Oman, where in the 1960s and 1970s China aided Dhofari rebels, or to Kuwait, where it 
is remembered that China proved weak supporters of the war to remove Iraq and of the 
subsequent UN sanctions. According to the well-connected Saudi journalist, ‘If history 
allows them to occupy, they will; they’re still imperialist, still fighting with the Japanese 
over nationalist interests.’  
 
11 In April 2002, Prince Turki Al-Faisal, then Saudi ambassador to the UK, presented three options at a 
subsequently reported off- the-record discussion. They were a US nuclear umbrella, seeking ‘regional 
support’ (which implied Pakistan) or pursuing its own nuclear programme (EIU 2002).  
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Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE joined NATO’s Istanbul Process, which was 
launched in 2004 to provide bilateral assistance in different aspects of security, whether 
institutional reform or dealing with asymmetric threats. While the participation of some 
GCC countries in this NATO-led process is seemingly coordinated with Saudi Arabia 
(interview, Al-Mekaimi, 2010), there is no collective GCC engagement with either 
NATO or specifically the USA.12 Historically Kuwait’s breaking of a national taboo by 
engaging the USA in defence of its oil tankers in 1986 opened the door to the same role 
for the rest of the GCC states, following retrospective GCC approval for Kuwait’s action, 
itself conducted with Saudi Arabia’s approval (Partrick 2006). However, this ‘regional’ 
protection was bilaterally provided, as it has continued to be to this day. In a recent 
confidential US memo, UAE Chief of Staff Hamad Al-Rumaithi is reported as arguing 
that, in the face of Iranian threats, ‘the UAE seeks ongoing support from the region’s 
“main actor”, the US, and desires closer defence coordination’.13 Separately the UAE 
foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayyed Al-Nahayyan, emphasized his country’s 
dependence on US regional strategy when he voiced a complaint, still commonly heard 
across the GCC, that the Gulf states are not a party to the periodic negotiations of western 
states with Iran, which have a direct bearing on them. ‘We still need some serious trust 
building between the US, the EU, and the GCC’, he said.14 More recently he suggested 
that a ‘GCC+3’ grouping should conduct talks with the P5+1 group (made up of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) that meets with Iran.15 
This increasingly strong UAE view of the need for the Gulf states to be properly 
consulted was expressed more publicly in the margins of the GCC annual summit 
conference in December 2010, when an unnamed UAE official commented, ‘We are not 
part of the problem, but we want to be part of the solution’ (Arab News 2010a). The 
crucial importance of the Gulf states’ bilateral relationship with the USA even played a 
 
12 In 2004 Kuwait was also designated by the USA as one of its ‘major non-NATO allies’. 
13 US Embassy Abu Dhabi confidential account of a meeting between Assistant Secretary of State for 
Defence Vershbow and UAE Chief of Staff Hamad Al-Rumaithi, 20 July 2010, 
http:/www.cablegate.wikileaks.org, accessed 1 December 2010. 
14 US Embassy confidential account of meeting between leading US Congressmen and Congresswomen 
and UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayyed, 16 May 2005, http:/www.cablegate.wikileaks.org, 
accessed 1 December 2010. 
15 US Embassy confidential account of meeting between Hilary Clinton and Abdullah bin Zayyed, 7 April 
2009, http:/www.cablegate.wikileaks.org. ‘GCC+3’ implied Turkey as well as Egypt and Jordan. 
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role in their interest in an updated version of the GCC+2 dialogue – with Egypt and 
Jordan, which Washington encouraged as a building of regional dialogue in the face of 
common threat perceptions vis-à-vis Iran. Wariness of Egypt’s post-Mubarak direction, 
and a perceptible loss of this ‘prop’, seems to have encouraged Saudi consideration of 
Jordanian and Moroccan membership of the GCC. 
Individual GCC states look to the USA for critical security support, but are 
uncomfortable with being merely a mute partner in dealing with what they see as the pre-
eminent Gulf security issue at present: Iran (interviews, Gulf academics, 2007, 2008). 
This slight flexing of political muscles has been more assertively complemented in 
economic terms. The increased and sometimes economic power of a number of GCC 
states is, though, often ostentatiously brandished for reasons of symbolism rather than 
substance. This often reflects Gulf states’ petty-minded competition, as well as that 
between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, rather than a coherent strategy to secure influence. An 
Emirati scholar commented, ‘The families are saying we are providing for you, look how 
far we have come’ (interview, September 2010).  
Whether desired or not, the world economic downturn from 2008 emphasized the 
GCC states’ importance to the international economic recovery, and underlined 
something of an alternative economic model that they, in common with China and other 
global players, adhere to: ‘state-supported capitalism’ (Ulrichsen 2010). This does not 
mean that the stronger, wealthier Gulf states will outgrow the need to be members of the 
GCC. As a political association in which a construct of Arab solidarity can sometimes 
usefully be deployed, divisions can hopefully be managed and practical forms of 
economic cooperation are being advanced, it has its uses. Strategic bilateral relations with 
the USA also sit comfortably with Gulf Arab involvement in the GCC. The relative 
economic dynamism of the UAE economy and the international profile this affords, and 
the sheer weight of Saudi Arabia as an oil player, are not without their problems, 
economic and political. This suggests limits to how confident even these states would feel 
in venturing forth without a formal Gulf alliance. 
6. REGIONAL OR NATIONAL INTERESTS?
What has been called the ‘Arab Gulf moment’ (Abdulla 2010) serves to underline the 
state-centric focus of individual GCC states. Their urging that they receive greater 
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representation in the international financial institutions is posited in individual terms and 
expected on an individual basis (Ibrahim Al-Assaf, Saudi finance minister, cited in 
Ulrichsen 2010). While Saudi Arabia’s membership of the G20 is seen by some within 
the region as an acknowledgement of the Gulf states’ increased global economic 
importance, the Kingdom no more ‘represents’ the GCC at G20 meetings than Qatar will, 
rhetoric aside, in hosting the 2022 World Cup, or for that matter than Lebanon 
represented the Arab world on the UN Security Council over 2009–11. In this sense the 
GCC states’ desire to be heard and represented in international economic fora is a very 
soft16 form of regionalism. The demand, just like that of the UAE concerning western-led 
talks with Iran, potentially increases their domestic and regional legitimacy, offsetting 
delegitimizing perceptions of weakness in the face of western allies. There is, though, 
only a limited sense of leveraging this economic strength politically, as for example in 
the UAE’s success in securing Abu Dhabi as the location for an international renewable 
energy centre, IRENA (Carrington 2010), albeit that this was more about the country’s 
economic status and a desire to market it in a perceptibly more environmentally friendly 
fashion. In part reflecting their economic focus and a traditional disinclination to be 
overexposed domestically or regionally in political terms, quiet political influence on a 
national basis is sought by the leading GCC states, not a pronounced assertion that could 
draw them more actively into diplomatic processes with which they would be 
uncomfortable. The role of regionalism in this push for greater respect on an international 
stage, in which interstate economic cooperation, not global economic norms, is being 
asserted, is as a prop of national interests. Competitive GCC states are increasingly 
flaunting their economic prestige, to some extent nationalistically, and regional demands 
are an instrumental part of this.  
That said, the GCC sits awkwardly as a ‘region’, when the Gulf as geopolitical 
space obviously takes in the two states that chiefly spawned the GCC’s formation, Iraq 
and Iran. Relations with these two countries remain mediated through a unilateral US 
relationship, even, as seen above, if this produces some periodic political disquiet. Other 
regional groupings, such as ASEAN and ECOWAS, have, in consultation or partnership 
with the UN, taken on peacekeeping roles, while ASEAN has also expanded to set up an 
 
16 Louise Fawcett (2004) refers to soft regionalism as informal cooperation within a region. 
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institutional dialogue (ASEAN plus 3: ‘APT’) with the three pre-eminent East Asian 
powers, China, Japan and South Korea. By contrast, the ‘GCC+2’ sought to isolate Iran. 
It is true that individual GCC states have pursued confidence-building mechanisms with 
Iran such as joint maritime military exercises or notification of national ones, while 
several of these states have opened diplomatic relations with the new Iraqi regime and 
written off the former regime’s debts. Beyond this, however, the ability of the GCC to 
transfer the organizational apparatus of cooperation into coordinated policy towards Iraq 
or Iran looks limited. On the economic front, an attempted drawing together and 
simplifying of external trade procedures for goods entering the GCC ‘region’ fits with the 
widespread conception among GCC states that increased economic weight would give 
them ‘a seat at the table’ in international economic fora.17 How such weight might be 
coordinated, let alone represented at the high table, is unclear. Saudi Arabia’s seat at the 
G20 would perhaps be bolstered by the agreement of a GCC common currency (Posen 
2010); how this would aid the GCC states collectively is less obvious.  
In a sense, seeking a stronger Gulf voice in international economic affairs 
suggests that the GCC states are regionally and proactively resisting ‘globalization’, at 
least in the form of a western-dominated economic model. International criticism of Gulf 
states’ individual record of adherence to the putative ‘global’ norm of human rights meets 
a more insular response, however, firmly rooted in a conception of national sovereignty 
(Ulrichsen 2010). There is arguably a Khaleeji political norm of a hereditary polity with 
varying degrees of political inclusion of non-ruling family politicians in executive 
decision-making, something alluded to in the GCC charter’s reference to ‘common 
characteristics’. Maintaining their own political traditions is collectively defended by the 
GCC, but more typically this is done with the rejection of the emergent, but still 
contested, ‘global’ norm of humanitarian intervention.  
The GCC’s regional ‘institutionalization’, reflected in attendant regional decision-
making fora, has not deepened to create an increasing norm of cooperation, even if ad 
hoc cooperation has been seen. There is no ‘multilayered governance’18 in the GCC. 
 
17 For instance, GCC Assistant Secretary General Mohammed Al Mazroui, a Saudi, quoted in Hartley 
(2009); Kuwaiti officials quoted in EIU (2010a). 
18 A term adopted by Fawcett (2004: 431) to describe the variety of forms of authority that states can be a 
part of. 
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Rather there is what Fawcett has described as the ‘striking disjuncture between shared 
ideas and institutions in the Middle East’ (2004: 442). Fawcett has also noted that in 
general new, ‘fragile’ states are highly defensive of the relatively recent acquisition of 
sovereignty, and that such organizations in the developing world can ‘cynically’ provide 
‘a veneer of regionalism to cover state interests’ (2004: 444, 439).  
Against this backdrop GCC states can sometimes agree to deploy the symbols of 
cooperation, but, with only the partial exception of economic affairs, not the substance. 
Monetary union, if applied, would end each country’s formal fiscal policy independence, 
albeit that to a greater or lesser extent their national currencies are all already pegged to 
the US dollar. Before monetary union could be created, interstate agreement would have 
to be reached on decision-making mechanisms at the proposed central bank, and on its 
access to each country’s international reserves, among other nationally sensitive issues. 
The GCC’s collective policy endeavour on Yemen has been comparable to the 
GCC’s public presentation of a common, unified position on Iraq, whether opposing the 
war between it and Iran in the 1980s, seeking a diplomatic end to the Gulf crisis in 1990, 
or opposing a US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. As already seen, collective policy 
positions provide cover to an individual state leadership embarking on an action that 
might be viewed sceptically at home. The GCC provided post facto support to Saudi 
Arabia when, in November 2009, it took what in modern times was a rare step for the 
Kingdom, that of sending ground troops into Yemen, or when it presented its regional 
uranium enrichment initiative towards Iran in 2007, itself more about atmospherics than a 
Saudi desire to shoulder the diplomatic burden with Iran (Partrick 2007: 25).  
In December 2006 the GCC announced that the Secretariat would commission 
research into the development of civil nuclear power, a decision that a senior analyst at a 
local, semi-official think tank presented as sending a signal to Iran of potential military 
options in the future (Hurst 2007). While GCC Secretary-General Abdulrahman Al-
Attiyah initially coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 
these research plans, those close to official thinking in Saudi Arabia and the UAE saw the 
initiative as the precursor to national programmes (Partrick 2007). Since 2008 the UAE, 
and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, have forged ahead with plans for their own national 
nuclear programmes. 
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The imprimatur of collective GCC backing serves an instrumental purpose for 
individual Gulf states. Alternatively, GCC agreement can provide cover for individual 
state policies entirely at odds with the collective stance, as in 2003 when the GCC, just 
like the individual Gulf states, opposed a military invasion of Iraq but Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain in particular played a key role in facilitating the US-led 
military action. Similarly, the GCC and each individual GCC state regularly urges a 
diplomatic, peaceful solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme.19 However, Saudi 
Arabia’s King Abdullah has privately told the USA to take military action against it,20 
and the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Mohammed Bin Zayyed, has been documented 
comfortably discussing US military responses to what he considers the unacceptable 
scenario of an Iran with nuclear weapons.21 In fact a top UAE official has even gone 
public in expressing support for military action in the event that Iran develops a nuclear 
weapons capacity.22 
7. EXPANDING THE GCC 
The GCC’s relations with Yemen have followed a familiar pattern of symbolic collective 
action. However, in one key respect at least, the GCC cannot simply function as a cover 
for policies determined at the national level: that of whether to admit Yemen as a GCC 
member. A longstanding Yemeni objective was in 2005 met with a ten-year timeline 
proffered by GCC heads of state meeting in Abu Dhabi. It is doubtful, though, that any of 
the GCC states seriously wanted to allow Yemen to move beyond its membership, agreed 
at the December 2001 GCC heads of state summit of the GCC’s health and labour and 
social affairs committees, to full GCC membership. The GCC also granted Yemen the 
right to play in the Gulf Football Cup, a right that had always been extended to Iraq. 
Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh famously quipped that the next stage would be the 
GCC basketball team. After all, despite geographic proximity and some comparative 
social features, full GCC membership for republican Yemen would run counter to the 
 
19 For example at the December 2010 GCC annual summit (Arab News 2010b). 
20 US embassy cable from Riyadh to Washington, DC, 20 April 2008, http:/www.cablegate.wikileaks.org, 
accessed 28 November 2010.  
21 US embassy cable from Abu Dhabi to Washington, DC, 16 May 2005, 
http:/www.cablegate.wikileaks.org, accessed 28 November 2010. 
22 In July 2010, speaking in a public US forum, UAE ambassador to the US Yousef Al-Otaibi strongly 
implied that an Israeli attack on Iran was preferable to an Iran that had nuclear weapons (EIU 2010e). 
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promotion of a Gulf identity that has built on the ‘common characteristics’ of the 
hereditary regimes, a factor of even greater purchase in the debate about Jordanian or 
Moroccan membership (see below). Furthermore, the threat of civil war in Yemen from 
spring 2011onwards has seen the GCC states handle it purely as a neighbouring security 
problem in need of, essentially, Saudi diplomacy. Dressed up as a GCC initiative, the so-
called GCC Peace Plan, which Qatar soon pulled out of, remains stalled at the time of 
writing (EIU 2011a, 2011b). Even from his hospital bed in Riyadh, the Yemeni president, 
Ali Abdullah Saleh, is able to frustrate hopes for a managed transition to a more inclusive 
government. 
Should internal political compromise somehow be agreed in Yemen, a resumption 
of some version of the managed pluralism of the country’s competing political parties is 
not likely to make the country any more desirable as a full GCC member. Rather, what 
hitherto had been the agreed GCC policy line represented a compromise between the 
desire of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to bolster the political leadership of an unstable 
neighbour that could be an external security problem, and Kuwait, which has maintained 
a firm rejection of Yemen ever since joining, due to the latter’s stance on the Iraqi 
occupation in 1990. Prior to the outbreak of violence in Sana in 2011 there had been a 
reawakening in Yemen of southern secessionist challenges, the development of an armed 
northern Shia movement with alleged Iranian links, and a growth in Al-Qaida activity. 
The GCC in response quietly buried its official timeline for Yemeni membership 
(Partrick 2010b). The USA and the UK in particular have pressed the GCC to take greater 
responsibility for Yemen, including the hope that efforts will be coordinated and will 
work in tandem with, not contradiction to, each other. However, periodic Qatari 
mediation in 2007–8 was frustrated by Saudi Arabia’s suspicions of interventions in its 
‘backyard’. State-centric calculations of interest have continued to trump pretensions to 
collective decision-making. Likewise the current GCC Peace Plan, while formally owned 
by all the member states, has emphasized how pivotal Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s large and 
influential neighbour, is in prospects for a political settlement there. Without Riyadh 
publicly associating itself with an alternative to Saleh, external diplomacy seems stymied. 
More modestly, the GCC, under US and UK pressure, committed itself to aid 
Yemeni development needs. However, Gulf Arab developmental capabilities are 
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constrained at the national, let alone collective GCC, level. Despite this, a commitment to 
a common GCC development office was made, even though individual GCC states have 
no such dedicated developmental presence and no framework for coordinating their aid 
programmes. This would be a constraining factor on any collective capability and is 
acknowledged as such by local observers (interview, Qatari journalist, 2010). Yemen 
continues to demand increased access to the labour markets of GCC states. It argues that, 
together with Gulf aid money, this would assist economic development and thereby help 
counter internal security problems and reduce the gap in living standards between Yemen 
and the GCC which has been argued by some Gulf states as a reason not to grant it 
membership. The GCC states argue either that increased labour market access is a 
security issue or that it is a matter of the suitability of Yemeni workers’ skill sets. Some 
GCC countries are seeking to address the latter issue by promoting job training strictly 
inside Yemen, but, like aid provision, without coordination with other Gulf states.  
Periodically the issue of Iraq’s relationship with the GCC is raised by Iraqi 
officials who urge some form of association including a more open trade regime. While 
never saying ‘never’ in public, the GCC states are uniformly resistant to any kind of 
association with post-Saddam Iraq, in contrast with their attitude to Yemen. The rationale 
behind the GCC’s creation – that the Gulf Arab states should associate together to offset 
the pressure from both Iraq and Iran – has not been lessened following a change of 
regime in Baghdad that has given Iran weight in Iraq and aided its position in the wider 
region. 
The surprise announcement by the GCC Secretary-General Abdullateef Al-Zayani 
in May 2011 that Jordan and Morocco had been invited to begin accession talks with the 
member states of the GCC provided further evidence that the organization lacks an 
integrated policy machine or even meaningful consultation. Apparently the result of a 
whim of Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah, the announcement even took Morocco by 
surprise, not to mention some actual GCC member states, including Kuwait and the UAE 
(EIU 2011b). Kuwait would not welcome Jordan’s admittance in particular, given King 
Hussein’s apparent backing for Iraq in the 1990–1 Gulf crisis. The UAE has sought a 
delay in talks taking place. Exploratory talks, however, began at a GCC summit in Saudi 
Arabia in mid-September 2011. 
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This initiative was not about the GCC having substance as an institutional 
‘regime’ with its own collective momentum, nor did it suggest that Gulf regionalism was 
strongly rooted as a concept. In fact it clearly showed the GCC to be a loose coalition of 
convenience between broadly like-minded, but uncoordinated, states. Following the 
change of leadership in Egypt, a long-time ally of the Gulf states, this initiative appears to 
have been born of a largely Saudi desire to see whether the military capabilities and 
relative size of the Jordanian and Moroccan armed forces can enhance Gulf security vis-
à-vis Iran and other potential regional external threat scenarios, and, by Arab monarchies 
and sheikhdoms drawing together, to try to offset shared political pressures in the wake 
of the 2011 Arab Spring through mutual economic support. 
Jordan first applied to join the GCC in 1988. As a bordering country with large 
number of skilled workers in the GCC area, Jordan already has fairly strong connections 
with the GCC (Al-Sharif 2011). It is argued, however, that Jordan does not need to be in 
the GCC to gain Saudi or other GCC states’ economic support, while the prospect of 
greater access to the Gulf labour market for the relatively populous Jordanian and 
Moroccan workforce contradicts the GCC states’ desire to ‘nationalize’ their workforce 
(Partrick 2010a). More fundamentally, perhaps, Jordanian membership would bring the 
perceptibly risky outcome of a de facto GCC border with Israel and deepen the 
perceptible security problem of largely Palestinian Jordanians, whose role in the Gulf 
crisis of 1990–1 strengthened an extant trend towards non-Arab foreign labour in Kuwait 
and more widely in the Gulf Arab states (Partrick 2006: 223).  
There is the possibility of something less than full membership, possibly some 
kind of associate status, being granted, to existing or would-be applicants. This seems 
feasible in the case of Jordan at least; it is unlikely to happen in the case of longstanding 
candidate country Yemen. In part the threatening civil conflict in Yemen will have 
hardened resistance within the GCC even further, on the basis that, even on a partial 
basis, the risks of Yemeni membership are those of importing political problems. Such a 
concern is plainly also shared about Iraq. There is little interest, seemingly, in proffering 
staged membership in return for political and economic ‘goals’ being realized. After all, 
the extant members are at different stages of political and economic development and 
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seem uninterested in seeking to harmonize economic policies, for instance, as a prelude 
to more meaningful economic integration. 
8. CONCLUSION 
Any movement towards more substantive cooperation – whether in the economic or 
security realm – is unlikely without a willingness to compromise national political 
control. Former GCC Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara believes that the planned 
common currency is liable to continue to be frustrated by attachments to national 
sovereignty, regardless of the extant constraints on financial sovereignty. Sovereignty, he 
argues, is the block on all substantive agreement in the GCC: ‘If there is a discussion the 
word that is always raised is sovereignty. It’s sacrosanct’ (interview, Bishara, 2010)  
Despite their political similarities, there are significant variations in the operation 
of the political systems in the Gulf, which vary from the limited governmental 
consultation evident in the UAE to the frustrations caused to the government by an 
empowered legislature in Kuwait. However, all the GCC state leaderships concentrate the 
management of external relations, and much of the business of domestic affairs, in the 
hands of an executive dominated by members of the ruling family. These families are 
united in seeking to maintain a tight grip on their largely exclusive control of decision-
making and are not minded to share it with other ruling families in the region. As Al-
Duraiby observes, the GCC was ‘founded on the idea of preserving the autonomy, 
security and sovereignty of its member states’ (2009: 200). National identity and 
legitimacy in the GCC states have historically been embodied in a hereditary leadership 
whose state-led national ‘imagining’ reflects an exclusive interpretation of the national 
experience (Partrick 2009). Maintaining political legitimacy requires a judicious use of 
economic patronage and ‘correct’ ideational symbols. including adherence to Islamic and 
(residual) Arab norms. Khaleeji (Gulf) identity is necessarily presented as in accord with 
these symbols. The exercise of state sovereignty is inextricably bound up with the 
practice of ‘correct’ leadership, usually with little political accountability. In such an 
environment, the prospect of thirty years of partial political and economic cooperation 
eventually transforming into a compromise of national political authority seems remote. 
King Abdullah commented at a meeting of GCC ministers in October 2002 that inter-
state military integration in the GCC would not occur without political integration (Al-
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Duraiby 2009: 130–1). Foreign and defence policy options on key regional issues are, 
inevitably, bound up with national calculations. ‘Cooperation in extremis’ is how a Saudi 
working on political affairs at the GCC Secretariat characterizes the way the organization 
behaves. He cites collective plans he is aware of for disaster management, such as in the 
event of a nuclear leak in Iran, and contrasts this with the difficulty of a developing an 
agreed policy on preventing Iran having a nuclear weapons capability (interview, Saudi 
politics and security analyst, 2010).  
The difficulties in coordinating a common policy on Yemen,beyond the issuing of 
symbolic statements, is emblematic of how much the GCC has remained true to its 
original conception: to be a body encouraging cooperation, which from the outset felt 
more comfortable reducing economic barriers than coordinating defence or security 
policy. Despite the ambiguities of some of the GCC charter’s language, the organization 
was founded as nothing more than a cooperative body of sovereign Arab Gulf states that 
drew closer together as they felt their sovereignty to be under threat. Saudi Arabia’s 
attitude towards the GCC was less about its regional vulnerability than about fearing 
what the vulnerability of its smaller neighbours might lead them to do. A regional 
structure was the means for Saudi Arabia to seek to enhance its authority in the Gulf, and 
for its smaller neighbours to seek to ensure that that authority would not be at their 
expense and would be used to offset in part the greater perceived threat emanating from 
Iraq and Iran. This, though, was not a hard security alliance. The modest ambitions that 
lay behind subsequent attempts at military cooperation underscored the fact that member 
states looked to the GCC more as a kind of political fraternity than as a security pact. 
While a more clearly defined set of alliances with the USA did not begin to take shape 
until towards the end of the Iraq–Iran war, the Gulf states had in their different ways 
looked to the USA as a major extra-regional security guarantor long before the GCC’s 
creation. Events from 1990 did not so much prevent more coherent intra-GCC 
cooperation as underline its limitations. The 1991 Gulf War and events since have 
emphasized how much the organization is a loose association of comparable states 
superficially integrated but functioning as a high-level interstate body. The GCC has 
some of the features of a security community, albeit still dominated by intra-
governmental initiatives focused on trade and personal mobility and lacking non-
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governmental engagement. As an alliance it can often struggle to specify what it is 
aligned against. However, this is common among Middle East alliances (Walt 1987), 
even if this one is more substantial than its predecessors. Practical cooperation without 
constraining the ‘sacrosanct’ principle of sovereignty looks likely to continue to be the 
hallmark of the GCC.  
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